cent success in mapping the human genome in 2001, 3 years aheadof schedule, suggests that many thical, legal, and social concerns once in the realm of distant speculation are already upon us. The mapping of the human genome is not only the result of the efforts of thousands of individuals engagedin the project, but also of a paradigm shiftin the biological sciences. The convergence of information technology and biological science suggests that the accumulation of knowledge about human genetics will grow exponentially, much in the way computing power has in the past 20 years. In this article, the authors consider the ethical, legal, and social implications of these advances on the occupational health field. To highlight how general concerns about the misuse of personal genetic information have specific meaning in the employment context, this article begins with a brief review of the potential and limits of recent advances in toxicogenomic research. The article concludes with an assessment of the outstanding ethicaland legalquestions with whichworkers and healthprofessionals must grappleas advances in the field progress.
when taking the antimalarial drug primaquine (Office of Technology Assessment, 1990) . This experience led to the conclusion that G6PD deficiency might also be a marker of individual hypersensitivity to aromatic nitro and amino compounds including arsine, lead, and several dye intermediates (Stokinger & Fibison, 1963) . A subsequent attempt to link individual genetic make-up to disease susceptibility came in 1974, when the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) promulgated standards for 14 carcinogens that requireda physical examination, including the personal history of employees and their families, prior to their assignment in a regulated work area. This move was not withoutcontroversy, and in 1980, afterbeing embroiled in publicdisputeoverthe reference to geneticinformation in establishing carcinogen standards, OSHA released a statementclarifying its positionthat:
There is absolutely noOSHA standard that requires genetic testing of any employee....Exclusion of workers as a result of genetic testing runs contrary to the spirit and intent ofthe Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1980 (OSHA, 1980; Schill, 2(00) .
Since OSHA's policy clarification, a rapid expansion in the understanding of individual susceptibility to environmental illness has occurred. In 1991, Andre and Velasquez (1991) reported that at least 50 genetic markers thought to increase an individual's susceptibility to toxicor carcinogenic environmental agentshad been identified. Six years later, the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) identified a total of 554 genes potentially affecting susceptibility to environmental agents, and in 2003, NIEHS announced that the functional variants of 200 of these genes had been identified (Marchant, 2(03) . Thereis littlequestion that this number will grow dramatically in the next decade, and this advance could provide the basis for a fundamental shift from population to individual-based risk assessment in occupational and environmental health.
SHIFTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT
Toillustrate the importance of thisshift, consider theexample of a toxicant that has a risk of 10 deaths per million exposed workers. If pattems of individual susceptibility did notexist, theassumption would be thatthisriskis equally distributed across the population. Thus, each worker has a I in 100,000 chanceof dying if exposed to thisagentat the specified level. However, the interpretation of risk changes with the ability to identify susceptible individuals who havea I in 100chanceof death. In this case, 990,000 individuals would havevirtually no riskand 10,000 individuals wouldfacea I in 100risk. Not only does this have important clinical implicationsrelated to how to address the risk, but also it has critical psychosocial meaning for the affected individuals. For most, a risk of I in 100,000 is perceived as essentially negligible compared to the riskof I in 100.
Although the ability to move from population to individual-based risk assessment would seem to warrant a strong public health need to conduct genetic screening, genetic monitoring, and health-related removal on the basis of geneticinformation, manyfactors willlimitthe ability to accurately identify individual susceptibility (Marchant, 2003; Rothstein, 1999) . For instance, individuals with a given susceptibility gene may not face the same level of risk as one anotherbecauseof the presence of other geneticpredispositions that may interact with the known gene and increase diseasesusceptibility.
These limitations are important, especially in estimating probabilities of relatively rare events. For example, consider a traitthat occurs at a rate of I in 10,000 in the general population. Assume that a genetic marker allows identification of those who willcontract a particular occupational illness with 99.9%accuracy. Given thisprevalence of the traitand the accuracyof the test, 10 false positive results for every one true positive resultwill be identified. If the calculation concept of screening tests and false positives is difficult for manyhealth professionals to grasp,one can only assume evengreater difficulty amongnon-health professionals withdecision-making authority overcorporate occupational health policies.
Misinterpretation of genetic probabilities is compounded by two other occupational factors. First, U.S. law and legal traditions encourage risk-averse behavior among employers (Rothstein, 1999) . In seeking to avoid liability claims, employers may favor precluding a relatively large number of individuals with false positive indicators of susceptibility to prevent the occurrence of illness in the few who have true positive test results. Another factor results from the free labor marketand an imbalance between laborsupply and labor demand. Employers can exclude a relatively largenumberof individuals withfalse positive testresults without a significant effect on theirfirms.
Thus, in the absence of regulations related to genetic testing in the workplace, a genuine threatof genetic discrimination exists. Continued advances in genetic research will undoubtedly uncover more convincing genetic indicators of susceptibility andbehavioral traits. Misconceptions aboutrare traits and the risk of falsepositives could result in the exclusion from employment of not only those who face genuine health threats, but also many individuals whose risk is misstated as a resultof thesetests.
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ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF WORKPLACE GENETIC TESTING
Although the previous discussion highlights the limitations of refining individual risk assessment in occupational health,ethicalconcerns aboutthe use of geneticinformation in the employment context will persisteven if the accuracy of identifying individuals hypersensitive to environmental toxicants improves. The ethical dilemmasposed by genetic testing are illustrated by the following hypothetical case (Bohrer, 2002) .
In this hypothetical scenario, a relatively rare genetic variation allows researchers to establish that at the prevailing OSHA permissible exposure limitof one part per million of benzene, 100individuals per I million willcontract glioblastoma, a particularly virulent braintumor. It is further assumed that the risk is not equally distributed among the approximately 350,000 workers who have occupational exposure to benzene-for 99.9%of the workforce, the riskof contracting glioblastoma frombenzene exposure is virtually zero, andfor the remaining 350 workers, the risk of contracting glioblastoma is I in 100. Basedon these assumptions, it can be estimatedthat 3.5 workers willdie of glioblastoma as a resultof theirexposure to benzene.
In considering this hypothetical case, two possible solutions are offered. In the first, only the workers and their personalhealth care providers haveaccess to this information. It will be the decision of the workeralone to continue working with exposure to benzene, provided that the employee signs an informed consentabsolving the employer fromany liability. In thesecond scenario, theemployer hastherightto testthe workforce and the rightto remove the 350 susceptible workers from the work force. In both instances, thereare no nontoxic substitutes for benzene, and employers have sufficient powertoensurethatthepermissible levels of benzene willnot be lowered below thecurrent rate of one partper million.
In the first instance, where only individual workers and their personal health care providers know the test results and workers aloneare responsible for deciding whether to continue to work, a positive testindicates a I 41 100chanceof contracting glioblastoma. In this situation, a public health ethicis ignored (Gostin, 2002) . This ethic uses a utilitarian approach to determine whenthe statehas the authority to supercede individual rights to protect the public health. Thus, providing workers with a choiceas to whether to placethemselves at a 1 in 100chanceof death runs counterto society's interest in preventing individuals fromharming themselves.
Individual choicerelated to occupational health also undermines the widely held desireamongpublic health professionals to reducedisparities in health outcomes resulting from socioeconomic status. If workers have numerous alternative job prospects, it is difficult to imagine them placing themselves in a position of harmwitha I in 100chanceof contracting glioblastoma. If, on the other hand, workers have no job opportunities other than work that exposes them to benzene, they may find numerous ways to rationalize continued employment in a position thatsociety as a wholewouldconsider unreasonably risky.
A secondsolution to the scenario, whichgrants the employer the right to test and preclude or remove individuals from the work force, is also problematic. Whereas allowing individuals to choosetobe tested andplace themselves at high levels of risk violates the norms of public health, mandatory testing and restriction from employment violates valued individual rights. Genetic information is not only information about one's self, but also about family members, and therefore could be particularly proneto abuse. Individuals unusually susceptible to environmental exposures may also be at high risk for other diseases. Even those who are not at risk of developing glioblastoma in thishypothetical casecould, in an unrestrictive environment, be forced to provide employers withpersonal information thathas littleto do withthe riskfor whichtheyweretested.
Anotherconcern is related to the violation of rights and livelihood of individuals who havefalse positive tests. In this hypothetical case, 350 individuals are removed fromemployment as a resultof a test that reveals unusually high susceptibility to glioblastoma when exposed to benzene. Of these, 1% (3.5 individuals) willdevelop glioblastoma, and99% (approximately 347individuals) willtestpositive evenwitha low riskof contracting glioblastoma. Although theriskof glioblastoma may be viewed as sufficiently highto justifybarring individuals fromthe workplace, this may notbe the perspective of the 347 workers removed from the work force. They and others may legitimately argue that removing the risk, not the individual, is theappropriate wayto reducetheadverse consequences of benzene exposure.
LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO WORKPLACE GENETIC TESTING
In a Wall Street Journal article, science writer Sharon Begley (2004) refers to the "mythof genetic discrimination;' noting that genetic discrimination exists only in the "public imagination:' and thatresearch has not beenableto verify the anecdotal cases of genetic discrimination in insurance and employment (Hall& Rich, 2000) . She concludes thatfederal legislation banning the use of genetic testing in employment is unnecessary because it reinforces the public misperception thatgenesare destiny.
However, thehistory of occupational health in the United Statesis replete with scientists and otherprofessional groups misinterpreting or misleading workers about risks at work (Markowitz & Rosner, 2002) . Moreover, despite the limitations of predictive genetic tests, employers have already attempted to use genetic data to screen the work force, escape obligations of workers' compensation, and justifythe healthrelated removal of employees. This rea:lity combined with widespread and persistent misinterpretation of genetic research shouldheighten concern abouttheuseof genetic information in employment.
The U.S. legal context for workplace genetic testing is a complex web of developing statutory and case laws at the federal andstatelevels. Thesestatutes include theCivilRights Act(1964), theAmericans withDisabilities Act (ADA, 1990), the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (lllPAA, 1996 Federal Executive Order (Executive Order No. 13145,2000 , at least 31 state laws, and a pendingnational bill-the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (S. 1053,2003) .
When discussing the legal status of genetic testing, it is important to distinguish between the timing and the potential use of genetic data in employment, First is the question of DECEMBER 2005, VOL. 53, NO. 12 whether genetic testing, if allowed, shouldbe permitted preor post-employment. Related to thisis thedistinction between testing that is used to make hiring and job placement decisions (i.e., screening), and testing that measures ongoing geneticchanges, or the effects particular chemicals haveon the body's genetic make-up, for the benefit of exposed workers (i.e., monitoring). Although existing law would seem to precludemostworkplace genetic testing altogether, therearepotentially contradictory trends created by statutes and caselaw, and instances where clear distinctions, especially between . screening and monitoring, aredifficult to make.
PRE·EMPLOYMENT AND POST-EMPLOYMENT SCREENING
An employer mighttest potential or existing employees underthree scenarios: • Pre-employment, as partof the interview process. • Conditional job offer, aftera provisional offerof employmenthas beenmade.
• Post-employment, as partof ongoing review of workers' fitness to perform a specific job. Although the lawclearly rulesout testing in the first situation, theothertwosituations are not as obvious.
An early example of an attempt to screen out workers basedon theirbiological make-up is the UAW v. Johnson Controls case(1991). In Johnson, theemployer attempted to deny employment in certain jobs to women of childbearing agebecauseof the reproductive hazards posed by exposure to lead. The U.S. Supreme Courtruledthat the ban violated TItle VII of theCivilRights Act and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (1964) . Theonlyworkers affected by the policy werewomen, despite that lead exposure also poses reproductive hazards to men.Although gender, ratherthan any particular genetic disposition for a disease, was the factor used to screen workers, Johnson represents a useful analog to thecurrentdispute over genetic screening.
A second and closer analog is the 9th Circuit Court's decision in the Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratories case (1998). In this case, the employertested AfricanAmerican workers for sickle-cell anemia trait,a genetically linked disorder with a higher rate of incidence in the AfricanAmerican population. The Court ruled that the attempt to screen employees represented a violation of the workers' Fourth Amendment constitutional rights and their rightsunderthe CivilRightsAct (1964) . Therewas no legitimate need to exclude workers with sickle cell anemia trait because it did not have any recognizable effect on workers' abilities to performtheirjobs. The Court wenton to say that employees should not be required to provide genetic information as part of post-hire physical examinations. These cases demonstrate that the courts are leery of screening basedon supposed linksbetweengenderor raceand particular disorders without a compelling reason to exclude those workers or an equal scrutiny of other workers.
The ADA (1990) prevents employers from requiring health-related examinations prior to an offerof employment. The intent is to prevent employers from predicating hiring decisions solely on perceptions of a potential employee's health history. However, employers may require examinationsafter a provisional job offerhas been made,prior to the startof employment, as part of determining a final fitness for employment decision. If an otherwise qualified employeeis found unfit for a particularjob becauseof disability and no viableaccommodation can be made under provisions of the ADA,the employeris free to rejectthat employee. When the ADAwas passedin 1991, it referenced "medicaltesting"but not "genetictesting." The U.S.EqualEmployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)added genetictestingto its definition in a 1995 policy directive, which specified that genetic discrimination claims were covered under provisions of the ADA that protected individuals "perceived to be disabled" (EEOC, 2000) .Thus, the policywouldappearto ban the use of pre-employment genetic testing altogether, but an EEOC recommendation does not carry the weightof lawand, therefore, this directive does not resolve the questionof the legal use of geneticdata in employment.
The extentto which an employercan rely on a post-hire examination was recently tested by the U.S. SupremeCourt in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal (2002) . In this case, an applicant for a permanent position at Chevron was given a post-jobofferphysicalexamination and foundto havehepatitis C. The employer denied Echazabal continued employment based on his health, which the company judged would be aggravated by his exposure to chemicals on the job. Echazabal sued under the ADA, arguing not that he should be accommodated with any particularprotection or alternative work, but based on the theory that it was the worker's right to decide whether to bear the risks of chemical exposure. The Supreme Court rejected that argument and stated that the employer had an overruling right and responsibility to maintaina safe and healthyworkplace, and that exclusion from the job was the only alternative under consideration. AlthoughChevron U.S. A. Inc. v. Echazabal (2002) does not use genetic data, it does reinforce an employer's right to reject a worker based on that employer's assessment of an individual's environmental susceptibility.
Recognizing the potential discriminatory effectof genetic information, 31 stateshavepassed laws providing varying levels of legal protection to employees. Many of these state laws, however, are far from comprehensive. For instance, in many states a law may prohibit discrimination based on individuals' personal genetic information, but not based on their relatives' genetic information. Additionally, some states prohibit only requiring genetic tests, but allow employers to request genetic tests. In these states, there is no certainty that potential or current employees will not view such a request as being tantamount to a requirement. To date, none of these state statutes have been contested in the courts. At the federallevel, 6 yearsafterit was firstintroduced, the U.S.Senate unanimously passedthe Genetic Information Nondiscrimina-tionAct in October 2003(S. 1053). Withno apparent opposition from the White House, it seemed this bill might easily pass the House of Representatives and be enacted into law. However, the bill did not come up for a vote in the Houseof Representatives because of opposition fromindustry and lack of political support.
POST-EMPLOYMENT GENETIC MONITORING
Although the pending Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (S. 1053, 2003) would seem to provide comprehensive prohibition against the use of genetic in-532 formation in pre-employment screening, the decision is less clear in relation to genetic monitoring and the healthrelated removal of employees. OSHA currently requires the use of biometric data for a number of chemicals. For instance, workers with workplace exposure to lead above a particular threshold are subject to periodic tests. Should monitoring find that a worker has elevated levels of lead, this employee must be removed from work with lead exposure until blood lead levels return to pre-exposure levels. Currently, OSHA standards require surveillancefer 34 substances. These monitoring protocols currently do not include the direct analysis of genetic data, but after such cost effective tests are available, a new impetus to collect and analyze such data will exist.
Whereas current OSHA and Department of Energy monitoring efforts generally focus on the health of workers, private employers alreadyhave attempted to use genetic monitoring for other purposes. Perhaps the most dramatic post-employment exampleof genetic testing illustrating the potential for abuse by employers is the settlement decree in EEOC v. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railroad Company (2001) . In this case, a railroadworker, Avary, was testedwithouthis knowledgefor a geneticmarkerpurported to indicate a predisposition for hereditary neuropathy with liability to pressure palsy (HNPP)-a carpal tunnel-like condition. Avary was returning to workfrom disability leave for a carpal tunnel condition and became suspicious of the blood test he was beingasked to take.When queried,the individual collectingthe samplerevealed that his blood would be used for a DNA test. Presumably, the employer would have used the information in making decisions concerning workers' compensation benefits. Some controversy remains as to the relationship betweenChromosome 17 deletionand HNPP. One study argued there was no legitimate scientific basisfor the use of the test to establisha correlation between the marker and carpal tunnel syndrome (Schulte & Loma, 2003) . The EEOC settlement decree seems to have chilled possible interest in genetic workplace testing, but because it was not litigated, a definitive answer as to whether the EEOC's guidelines on the use of genetic information will prevail in the post-Avary environment is uncertain.
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF WORKPLACE GENETIC TESTING
As with manyissues related to genetic testing, the implications for employment overlap withbroadersocial concerns. Advances intoxicogenomic research thatprovide newinsights into individual susceptibility can contribute to a broadertrend of shifting responsibility to the individual and awayfrom the stateand employers (Nelkin, 1999) . The identification of new gene and environment interactions may concentrate focus on individuals withhigh susceptibility ratherthan decreasing exposures in the workplace environment.
In the United States, insurability is another area where thereis considerable overlap of employment and broadersocialimplications. Advances intoxicogenomic research andgeneticresearch willplacegreaterfiscal stresson the current insurance practices in theUnitedStates. HIPAA (1996) restricts theuse of genetic information concerning employees enrolled in groupinsurance programs. However, the restrictions do not apply to those who purchase individual policies-a growing segment of the workforce with the decline of employer-paid group plans. For profitreasons, insurers may seek to exclude individuals withrecognized genetic susceptibility. The costof health care for the uninsured is paid through higherMedicaid costsand higherpremiums for the insured.
CONCLUSIONS
Many issues raised by genetic testing and monitoring in the workplace remain unresolved given the pace of advances in toxicogenomics andthe patchwork oflegal guidelines governingit. For health professionals, as wellas individual workers, thesequestions deserve a thorough discussion: • Whatlevel of disease penetrance (i.e., the extentto which the presence of a genetic condition is expressed as a disease) warrants the implementation of a workplace genetic monitoring program? • Howwillemployers handle the consequences of false positive teststhat alarmworkers or causethemto be excludedfrom the workplace? • Howwillemployers handlethe consequences of false negative tests thatcreatefalse confidence that individuals will not develop an occupational disease? • Can voluntary monitoring programs be effective when theydo not produce comprehensive data on a groupof workers and theirpotential development of occupational diseases? • Whatare the ethical consequences of mandatory monitoring?Who shouldhaveaccess to the results of that monitoring? Howshallworkers who are excluded from work becauseof a genetic testbe compensated?
Inthecomingdecade, advances ingenetic research promise to transform the understanding of gene and environment interactions and individual susceptibility. The extentto which theseadvances lead to new therapies, protective measures, or the exclusion of individuals with particular genotypes from the workplace remains to be determined. In the near future uncertainty aboutthe relationship between individual genetic pro.fil~s and di~e~e expression will likely limitthe use of genetic information in employment decisions. Over time,however, as the science of toxicogenomics allows even greater precision in predicting individual susceptibility, the economic pressure on employers to use suchinformation willgrow. Occupational health professionals can play a crucial role in engagingin dialogue as to whatguidelines shouldgovern theuse of genetic information in the workplace.
IN SUMMARY
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1 Advances in toxicogenomics research may allow the identification ofindividuals who may be hyper-susceptible tooccupational exposures and could create ashift from population toindividual-based risk assessment in occupational health.
2 Although many states have passed legislation toprevent the misuse ofgenetic information in employment, there isno general federal protection from the use ofgenetic information after aconditional offer ofemployment.
3 Occupational health professionals have acrucial role in shaping future guidelines governing the use of genetic information in employment.
